Asymmetric Effects of Government Spending: Does the Level of Real Interest Rates Matter? by Woon Gyu Choi & Michael B. Devereux
147
IMF Staff Papers
Vol. 53, Special Issue
© 2006 International Monetary Fund
Asymmetric Effects of Government Spending: 
Does the Level of Real Interest Rates Matter?
WOON GYU CHOI and MICHAEL B. DEVEREUX*
This paper empirically explores how fiscal policy (represented by increases in
government spending) has asymmetric effects on economic activity across differ-
ent levels of real interest rates. It suggests that the effect of fiscal policy depends
on the level of real rates because the Ricardian effect is smaller at lower financing
costs of fiscal policy. Using threshold vector autoregression models on U.S. data, the
paper provides new evidence that expansionary government spending is more con-
ducive to short-term growth when real rates are low. It also finds asymmetric effects
on interest rates and inflation and threshold effects associated with substitution
between financing methods. [JEL C32, C51, E62]
P
ostwar U.S. data exhibit substantial fluctuations in real interest rates. Changes
in real interest rates affect the cost of financing government spending and
the burden of future fiscal consolidation. This implies that the effects of fiscal
policy may depend on the level of real rates. In particular, fiscal policy may be less
expansionary in an environment of high real rates because a number of channels
(discussed below) limit the effectiveness of fiscal policy when the burden of financ-
ing is increased. This paper empirically examines how the effects of fiscal policy
(represented by increases in government spending) differ across different levels
of real rates.
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Why might the effectiveness of fiscal policy depend on the real rate? In standard
dynamic general equilibrium models, government spending shocks have positive
effects on output and investment through various channels, principally related to
intertemporal substitution and wealth effects on labor supply. These models, how-
ever, examine the local effects of fiscal policy shocks approximated around a steady
state in which the real rate is constant. In general, they abstract from the financing
consequences of the shocks, assuming that the size of the fiscal spending multiplier
does not depend on the method of financing. Even in dynamic models that do not
satisfy Ricardian equivalence, the fiscal policy multipliers are normally quite close
to those in the usual dynamic general equilibrium model with an infinite horizon
(Barry and Devereux, 2003).
Recent research, however, has emphasized that the financing consequences of
fiscal policy may be critical for the effectiveness of policy itself. In particular, a
large literature on the possibility of contractionary effects of fiscal policy argues
that, in times of large deficits and growing public debt, government spending can
have a weak or even negative impact by affecting expectations about future taxes.
Government spending and public debt could reach a level at which further spend-
ing causes a precipitous fall in consumption by triggering expectations of a fiscal
crisis. A number of papers have modeled the way in which fiscal policy can have
counterproductive outcomes through this mechanism: for example, one strand of
the literature proposes the “expansionary fiscal contraction” hypothesis (Barry and
Devereux, 1995 and 2003; Sutherland, 1997; and Perotti, 1999).
The level of real interest rates is critical for standard evaluations of government
debt sustainability (see, for example, Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano, 2003). Ball,
Elmendorf, and Mankiw (1998) suggest the emergence of a virtuous cycle in which
low real rates and rapid growth reduce fiscal debt burden. If the return on gov-
ernment debt is sufficiently below the output growth rate for a sufficiently long
period, the government can roll over the debt and accumulated interest without
raising taxes because output will likely grow faster than the debt will accumulate.
Conversely, if the output growth rate becomes low relative to the return on the debt,
the debt-output ratio will increase, and eventually the government will be forced to
raise taxes.
Since the level of real interest rates is important for the evaluation of the fiscal
burden, it may also be important for the effectiveness of fiscal spending. A persis-
tent shock to government spending affects the probability of hitting the upper limit
on the debt ratio and thus the probability of a future fiscal adjustment. When real
rates are low, a fiscal expansion that is financed by deficits rather than current taxes
raises the stock of public debt, but this does not generate a significant risk of
hitting the upper limit on the debt-output ratio. When real rates are high, however,
the same fiscal expansion is more likely to push government debt toward the upper
limit within the agents’ time horizon. Economic agents then perceive that fiscal
consolidation will be necessary and expect higher future tax rates on wages and
capital income. As a result, such a fiscal expansion can have a negative effect on
aggregate consumption and investment. Therefore, the impact of government spend-
ing will be very different, depending on whether real rates are high enough for the
economy to exceed the tolerable debt burden.ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING
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What leads to changes in real interest rates? This paper is mostly agnostic on
this question. Shifts in real rates (see, for example, Garcia and Perron, 1996) can
be associated with shifts in productivity or in time preferences. They can also be
caused by structural events, such as changes in the monetary regime or deregula-
tion of interest rates. Canzoneri and Dellas (1998) show that operating target pro-
cedures affect real rates in a stochastic general equilibrium model: interest rate
targeting results in higher real rates than does monetary aggregate targeting.
Many recent studies have examined the effect of fiscal policy shocks based
on government spending (for example, Blanchard and Perotti, 2002; Alesina
and others, 2002; and Fatás and Mihov, 2003). Typically, changes in government
spending are associated with changes in government debt rather than in the tax
rate because government debt is managed to maintain a pattern of reasonably
stable tax rates over time, although sometimes government debt and associated
interest payments force the government to raise taxes.1 Following this line of
research, we focus exclusively on government spending in assessing the effect of
fiscal policy.
To examine nonlinearities in the effect of government spending that arise from
shifts in the cost of financing, we employ threshold regression methods (Tong,
1990; Choi, 1999; and Hansen, 1999 and 2000). Our model specification allows
government spending shocks to have different effects on economic activity,
depending on the level of real interest rates. The results obtained using U.S. time
series data suggest that asymmetry in fiscal policy effects is associated with non-
linearity in the behavior of investment growth, output growth, and interest rates
across different levels of real rates. Linearity testing supports the existence of a
double threshold (that is, three regimes), and impulse-response analysis reveals
pronounced asymmetries in the dynamic response of the economy to a government
spending shock.
We provide new evidence that expansionary government spending is con-
ducive to stimulating growth in the short run when an economy faces compara-
tively low real interest rates. We also find asymmetric effects of government
spending on nominal and real rates of interest: there are positive effects on nom-
inal interest rates when real interest rates are low, but negative effects on nomi-
nal and real interest rates when interest rates are sufficiently high, which is in
accord with earlier studies (Evans, 1985 and 1987; and Mankiw, 1987). In addi-
tion, we find positive inflation responses to government spending only when
real interest rates are sufficiently low, which reconciles the cross-country evi-
dence of recent studies on the association of fiscal balance and inflation (Koelln,
Rush, and Waldo, 1996; Fischer, Sahay, and Végh, 2002; and Catão and Terrones,
2003). Furthermore, we provide some evidence on threshold effects associated
with substitution between government debt and money for financing government
spending.
1Davig, Leeper, and Chung (2004) suggest that tax policy reactions can shift between periods when
taxes are adjusted in response to government indebtedness and periods when other priorities drive tax deci-
sions. We focus on government spending and its implications for future tax liabilities but not on the tax
policy behavior itself.Woon Gyu Choi and Michael B. Devereux
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I. Relevant Literature on the Effectiveness of Fiscal Policy
There are numerous different theoretical approaches to the analysis of fiscal
policy. In a simple Keynesian framework with price rigidity, a fiscal expansion
has a multiplier effect on output. If government spending increases interest
rates, however, then “crowding-out” dampens the multiplier effect.2 Although
fiscal policy analysis traditionally focuses on its demand-side effects, there
could be supply-side effects that add to the effectiveness of fiscal policy.3 Gov-
ernment spending on investment-type goods helps augment production capacity
and thus tends to increase the fiscal multiplier by ameliorating the crowding-
out effect.
On the other hand, the neoclassical approach to fiscal policy suggests that the
effects of government spending stem mainly from intertemporal substitution and
wealth effects (Barro, 1981; Aiyagari, Christiano, and Eichenbaum, 1992; Christiano
and Eichenbaum, 1992; and Baxter and King, 1993). The wealth effect through a
Ricardian channel is operative as long as increases in government spending today
imply increases in current or future taxes. The resulting fall in wealth reduces con-
sumer demand, increases labor supply, and lowers interest rates (Devereux and
Love, 1995; and Barry and Devereux, 1995), and the increase in labor supply in turn
increases the marginal productivity of capital and spurs investment (Ramey and
Shapiro, 1998; and Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher, 2003). The size of the wealth
effect depends on whether the change in government spending has purely transi-
tory or persistent effects.
Ricardian equivalence (Barro, 1974; and Evans, 1988) suggests that increased
government spending will create future liabilities anticipated by agents. Empirical
studies, however, have provided mixed results for Ricardian equivalence (for list-
ings of studies, see Evans, 1988; and Hemming, Kell, and Mahfouz, 2002). If the
private sector does not fully account for or discount the future taxes implied by
increased government spending because agents have a short time horizon, less
than perfect foresight, or binding borrowing constraints, Ricardian effects are only
partial, or consumer spending will be dependent on current income (for example,
Blanchard, 1985; Campbell and Mankiw, 1989; and Mankiw, 2000). In this case,
fiscal policy can retain a stabilization role, and the issue of its effectiveness remains.
Campbell and Mankiw (1989), using time series analysis, find the quantitative impor-
tance of “rule-of-thumb consumers”—those who do not borrow or save but consume
their current income fully—possibly reflecting that numerous consumers facing
binding borrowing constraints cannot engage in the intertemporal consumption-
smoothing. Findings from micro data support a strong influence of current income
2In an open economy, higher interest rates induce capital inflows and real exchange rate appreciations,
which result in a deteriorating current account and offset the increase in domestic demand arising from a
fiscal expansion.
3Since public services can be considered as an input to private production, government spending on pub-
lic goods and infrastructure can lead to faster economic growth (Aschauer, 1989; Barro and Sala-ì-Martin,
1992; and Tanzi and Zee, 1997). Such supply-side effects of fiscal policy are regarded as more important
over the longer term.ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING
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over consumption.4 Accounting for the role of such rule-of-thumb consumers or
“spenders,” Mankiw (2000) suggests that temporary tax changes have large effects
on consumption. More recently, Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2005), using a new
Keynesian model with sticky prices, show that government spending has an expan-
sionary effect on consumption when rule-of-thumb consumers coexist with conven-
tional infinite-horizon Ricardian consumers.
Contrary to both the conventional Keynesian and neoclassical views, some
papers suggest that fiscal spending can have negative impacts on real activity. The
“expansionary fiscal contraction” hypothesis suggests that fiscal contractions can,
through their impact on expectations, lead to growth in consumption and invest-
ment. In this hypothesis, a large or persistent fiscal contraction, after a prevailing
expansionary fiscal stance, signals the government’s adjustment that has been
delayed (Barry and Devereux, 1995; Sutherland, 1997; and Perotti, 1999). Such
episodic contractions are more likely to happen in the economies that need a fis-
cal adjustment (for the listing of related studies, see Alesina and Perotti, 1997;
Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano, 2000; Hemming, Kell, and Mahfouz, 2002; and
Alesina and others, 2002).
These studies emphasize that the effects of fiscal policy may depend on the
state of the economy. Two strands of studies emphasize nonlinearity in the effect
of fiscal policy. One strand focuses on the different characteristics of fiscal impetus.
Giavazzi, Jappelli, and Pagano (2000) suggest that nonlinear effects (on saving) are
associated with large and persistent fiscal impetus for industrial and developing
countries, whereas Alesina and others (2002) find little evidence for different
impacts of government spending (on investment) during large fiscal adjustments
rather than in normal times. Bayoumi and Masson (1998), using Canadian data,
show that national fiscal stabilizers have different impacts than local fiscal stabiliz-
ers because of their different implications for future tax liabilities. The second strand
of studies emphasizes expectations about fiscal adjustment for debt sustainability.
Bertola and Drazen (1993) suggest that, as government spending approaches a crit-
ically high level, a nonlinear relationship arises between government spending and
private consumption, consistent with the expansionary effect of large fiscal cuts
as part of stabilization programs. Sutherland (1997) theoretically and Perotti (1999)
empirically examine how the effect of fiscal policy depends on the level of public
debt, extreme values of which trigger consumers’expectations of an increase in their
future tax liability.
A fiscal expansion may also have effects on interest rates and inflation. Contrary
to the hypothesis that higher interest rates caused by the fiscal expansion would
have a crowding-out effect, Evans (1987) finds no positive association between
budget deficits and real or nominal rates of interest, consistent with Ricardian
4Findings from micro data help explain why consumption is strongly associated with current income:
consumption is affected by anticipated tax refunds (Shapiro and Slemrod, 1995) or predictable income
changes resulting from Social Security taxes (Parker, 1999); and a substantial fraction of households have
near-zero net worth (Wolff, 1998), implying that many consumers do not engage in the intertemporal
consumption-smoothing (Mankiw, 2000).Woon Gyu Choi and Michael B. Devereux
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equivalence. Mankiw (1987) argues that an increase in government spending
depresses the real interest rate because it reduces private consumption (through
a wealth effect) and increases the marginal utility of consumption, which lowers
the marginal rate of substitution and thus the marginal productivity of capital
(through capital accumulation). Government spending can alternatively be financed
with money creation which may lead to inflation, especially by governments
running persistent deficits. However, Dwyer (1982) finds no evidence that higher
current or past budget deficits raise the price level. Recent analyses of cross-
country data suggest that the positive association between fiscal deficits and
inflation is strong among high-inflation and developing countries but not among
low-inflation and industrial economies (Fischer, Sahay, and Végh, 2002; and
Catão and Terrones, 2003).
Many empirical studies examine the effect of government spending that is not
related to the current state of the economy and thus is less prone to simultaneity
problems. The empirical results on the effect of such spending are rather mixed.
Ramey and Shapiro (1998), using postwar U.S. data, find that a military buildup
decreases consumption and increases (nonresidential) investment, a finding con-
sistent with neoclassical models. Blanchard and Perotti (2002), using a structural
vector autoregression approach with U.S. data, show that a government spending
shock has a positive effect on output and consumption but a negative effect on
investment. Alesina and others (2002), using panel data from industrial counties,
find that spending shocks have a negative effect on investment, a finding con-
sistent with non-Keynesian effects of fiscal adjustment. Perotti (2004) provides
evidence on the decline in the potency of government spending over the last 
20 years for a group of industrial countries. Fatás and Mihov (2003), using panel
data from a large set of countries, find that discretionary fiscal policy induces
macroeconomic instability.
In this paper, we adopt a regime switching approach to capture asymmetric
effects of government spending across different regimes, considering that no sin-
gle approach—whether Keynesian, neoclassical, or Ricardian equivalence—can
always fit the data.
II. Empirical Model Specification and Estimation Methodology
Asymmetric Effects of Government Spending
Our results suggest the relevance of models in which full Ricardian equivalence
fails: agents are partially Ricardian, or a substantial fraction of agents are the rule-
of-thumb consumers described by Campbell and Mankiw (1989). Partial Ricardians
will reduce their spending in response to increased government spending to the
extent that such spending affects the expectation of future tax liabilities during
the time horizon they regard as relevant. If consumers are myopic enough to include
government debt as part of the stock of their private wealth, government spending
financed by debt may have a wealth effect (Kormendi, 1983). For rule-of-thumb
consumers who bear no cost of future taxation and barely hold government debt,
however, government spending has neither a Ricardian effect nor the wealthASYMMETRIC EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING
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effect.5 In the presence of price rigidities, the expansionary effect of fiscal policy
may lead rule-of-thumb consumers to increase consumption as fiscal policy boosts
their current income—the “spenders” effect (see Mankiw, 2000; and Galí, López-
Salido, and Vallés, 2005). Spending on public goods and infrastructure can also
lead to higher productivity and thus higher investment—a productivity-enhancing
effect (Aschauer, 1989; and Barro and Sala-ì-Martin, 1992). The boosting impacts
of fiscal policy, through borrowing constraints, wealth, and productivity-enhancing
effects, will be offset partly or fully—depending on the underlying regime—by
the adverse impact from the Ricardian effect. In addition, changes in real rates in
response to fiscal policy—depending on the underlying regime—have an intertem-
poral substitution effect on consumption.
Debt sustainability critically depends on whether real interest rates are suf-
ficiently lower than the rate of output growth. As noted earlier, the impact of
government spending may be very different depending on whether real interest
rates are high enough for the economy to exceed the tolerable debt burden. Since
shifts in real interest rates are given exogenously, agents will perceive the under-
lying regime as prevailing for a sufficiently long period.
Our regime switching approach allows the behavior of key variables in the sys-
tem and the net effect of government spending to vary over regimes. Based on the
level of real rates, we classify the underlying states into a “high-rate” regime, a
“moderate-rate” regime, and a “low-rate” regime. We estimate a multiple-equation
system—threshold vector autoregression (TVAR) models—comprising regime-
dependent, reduced-form equations, especially for government spending, con-
sumption (or investment), output, and interest rates.
A TVAR Model
Assuming that all variables are endogenous and that government spending depends
on other variables as well as its own past values, we consider a TVAR model with
three regimes in a simple, piecewise-linear form (see Tong, 1990; and Choi, 1999)
as follows:
where Yt = (Y1
t,...,Yk
t )′ is a vector of k variables; L is the lag operator; 
Vi,t = (ε1
i,t, ε2
i,t,...   εk
i,t)′ is a k × 1 vector of error terms, with Vi,t ∼ N(0, ΣVi) for
i=1,2,3; st is the switching index; and the thresholds are ordered (τL < τU).
Coefficients, denoted by Ai and Bi, vary across regimes. Errors are assumed to
be heteroscedastic across regimes. Threshold parameters, τL and τU, are assumed
to be fixed and should be estimated.
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5We are grateful to the referee for suggesting that we look at implications of borrowing constraints and
rule-of-thumb consumers for the consumption response to a government spending shock.Woon Gyu Choi and Michael B. Devereux
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Nonlinearity Testing and Number of Thresholds
If one or more individual equations involve threshold effects, such effects can feed
into the responses of the whole system. Especially if a transmission variable of gov-
ernment spending to private spending involves nonlinearity, it can have differential
impacts on aggregate demand. For this reason, our nonlinearity test is based on an
individual equation rather than the whole system.
Classical tests have nonstandard distributions when the threshold parameter
is unknown a priori and not identified under the null hypothesis of linearity—
a nuisance parameter problem, or the so-called Davies problem (Davies, 1987).
Following Hansen’s (1999 and 2000) approach to control for the Davies problem,
we obtain a consistent estimate of the threshold parameter(s) by minimizing the
sum of squared residuals of an equation over a grid set. In the context of equation
(1), there are zero, one, or two thresholds. To determine the number of thresholds
(and thus of regimes), we perform the likelihood-ratio test, which is nonstandard
but free of nuisance parameters using p-values constructed from a bootstrap pro-
cedure. Hansen’s approach also helps obtain the confidence interval for the thresh-
olds using the likelihood-ratio statistic for tests on thresholds.
In the single-threshold case, we set the bounded grid set for τ∈ [τ,τ –] so that
each regime has at least 20 percent of the whole sample. The grid set is composed
of 100 grids that evenly divide the range from the 20th to the 80th percentile of
the empirical distribution of the switching index. In the two-thresholds case, given
the first-stage threshold obtained from the estimation of the single-threshold
model, the grid set for the second threshold is composed of 50 grids, which
evenly divide the range of the empirical distribution of the switching index. As
suggested by Bai (1997) and Hansen (1999), we use the refinement estimator to
improve the efficiency of the threshold parameters by estimating threshold param-
eters in three stages.6
Specification Tests for Asymmetry Across Regimes
We test the null hypothesis that the coefficients in each equation are equal across
regimes. To deal with the Davies problem, we employ Hansen’s (1996) proce-
dure to approximate the unknown asymptotic distribution by simulation for test-
ing the hypothesis. We calculate three test statistics and use simulated realizations
of the chi-squared empirical processes underlying these statistics, assuming that
the error term is heteroscedastic across regimes but homoscedastic within each
regime. The statistics are functionals of the collection of Wald test statistics over
the grid space: the supremum (SupW), the average (AveW), and the exponential
average (ExpW) of all Wald statistics (Davies, 1987; Granger and Teräsvirta, 1993;
6In stage 1, we estimate a single threshold (τ1). In stage 2, the first-stage threshold is taken as the upper
(lower) threshold if it is above the 65th (below the 35th) percentile of the switching index. The grid set for
the other threshold (τ2) is composed of 50 grids on the side with the longer leg of the τ1 estimate. If the
first-stage threshold is between the 35th and the 65th percentile, the grid set for τ2 is composed of 25 grids
on each side of the τ1 estimate. In stage 3, we take the τ2 estimate as its refinement estimator (τr
2) and
repeat stage 2 to obtain the refinement estimator of τ1 (τr
1).ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING
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and Andrews and Ploberger, 1994). Their significance levels are calculated using
simulated empirical distributions of the statistics.7
In addition, we perform specification tests taking symmetry across given sub-
groups in the equation as the null hypothesis, as in Durlauf and Johnson (1995).
We do this by splitting the data into subgroups based on the assumed τ and exam-
ining whether the coefficients are equal across the subgroups. The τ ˆ obtained by
the grid search is taken as the assumed τ.
Analysis of a TVAR Model
To find the threshold values of a TVAR model, we employ a grid search, which is
useful because our regime switching approach is based on perfect discrimination
among regimes and the likelihood function is not differentiable in threshold param-
eters. For the minimization of the criterion function, the threshold parameter is
assumed to be restricted to a bounded set.
The grid search for our TVAR model, in accord with Pesaran and Potter (1997),
works as follows. Compared with the refinement estimator of a double threshold,
this approach jointly estimates the two threshold parameters, which are assumed
to be the same across individual equations in the system. We set grids by gen-
erating a g-length row vector of the grid for τL and τU, respectively, for its bounded
set. The pairwise combinations in τ form a g × g grid. We then estimate the TVAR
model by least squares for each point in the grid to find the estimate τ ˆ that maxi-
mizes the conditional log-likelihood and implies estimates A ˆ, B ˆ, and Σ ˆ
V. The
estimate τ ˆ will be consistent, as suggested in Pesaran and Potter (1997) and
Hansen (1996).8 Let τ=(τL, τU)′ and It(i: τ) be indicator functions with 
It(1: τ) = It(st ≤τ L), It(2: τ) = It(τL < st ≤τ U), and It(3: τ) = It(st > τU). The con-
ditional log-likelihood up to a constant term is given by
where (Yi − Ai − Bi(L)Yi
−1)(Yi − Ai − Bi(L)Yi
−1)′; Yi is the selected sample 
vector for regime i; Ni is the number of observations in regime i; and INi is an
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7We generate J (= 1,000) realizations of the Wald statistics, χ
2j
T (τ) (j=1,2, ...,J), under the 
null of symmetry for each grid and construct empirical distributions for three functionals of the 
collection of the statistics over grid space 
where #Γis the number of grid points in Γ.
8Hansen’s (1999) procedure, by minimizing the sum of squared errors in the threshold autoregressive
model, enables one to compute the confidence intervals of thresholds for a single equation. Hansen’s pro-
cedure for computing confidence intervals, however, is not readily applicable to the thresholds that are
obtained by the maximization of the conditional log-likelihood for multiple equations.
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We construct a total of 1,600 grid sets for τ=(τL, τU)′, allowing for 40 grids
for each threshold: the lower threshold ranges from the 20th to the 40th percentile
of the empirical distribution of st, and the upper from the 60th to the 80th per-
centile. We estimate TVARs with the same lag order in all regimes by the least
squares method. Then we obtain the impulse response function of the variables of
interest to an orthogonal fiscal shock obtained through the Choleski decomposi-
tion of ΣVi, assuming that the economy stays within its initial regime. Empirical
standard error bounds for the response function are obtained using the bootstrap
method (Runkle, 1987) with 1,000 replications.
III. Empirical Results
Data and Variable Sets for TVARs
We use U.S. quarterly time series data over the period 1959:1–2001:4. The details
of the data used in this paper are described in the appendix. The switching
index in period t is the lagged ex post real interest rate defined as rrt−1 = Rt−1
− 400 (Pt/Pt−1 − 1), where Rt and Pt are the nominal interest rate and the price
level, respectively, in period t. The three-month treasury bill rate is used as the
nominal interest rate. Inflation is measured on the basis of the GDP deflator.
The top panel of Figure 1 depicts the ex post real rate of return on three-month
treasury bills along with, for comparison, the ex ante real rate. The quarterly
expected inflation is interpolated from the semiannual inflation forecast from the
Livingston Survey database at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, and the
ex ante real rate is defined as the three-month treasury bill rate minus the expected
inflation. The ex post rate dipped in the 1970s as inflation rose, whereas the ex
ante rate also dipped but by a smaller amount, reflecting that the survey inflation
forecast was much smoother than actual inflation during that period of high and
volatile inflation. The decline in inflation, together with financial deregulation, in
the early 1980s may have led to a sharp, common drift in the ex ante and the ex
post rates, which is not closely related to the inflation process. After the mid-1980s
the real rate movement became rather steady, but the rate itself remained moder-
ately high. The ex ante rate is smoother than the ex post rate but tends to overshoot
before 1980, when inflation was high, and to somewhat undershoot afterward.
Choi (2002) shows that the real rate is negatively correlated with inflation when
inflation persistence, or inflation itself, is below a threshold.9
The middle panel of Figure 1 depicts the debt-output ratio, measured by nom-
inal federal government debt divided by nominal GDP. The ratio shows a different
time-varying pattern from the real rate: the debt-output ratio exhibited a downward
trend in the 1960s followed by an upward trend in the 1980s and the first half of
the 1990s.10 The bottom panel shows growth in total government spending (real
9Inflation was rather persistent in the late 1960s and high and persistent after the 1973 oil shock. The
Federal Reserve’s anti-inflation policy kept inflation in check in 1982, and thereafter policy has consis-
tently aimed at keeping inflation low.
10The regime classification according to the level of government debt (Sutherland, 1997; and Perotti,
2004) is associated with the “accumulation” of government spending that has been financed by government
bond issuance, reflecting the level of “fiscal stress” of the economy.ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING
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government consumption expenditures and gross investment) and in national defense
spending (real national defense consumption expenditures and gross investment).
Government spending grew rather rapidly in the 1960s and the mid-1980s. Growth
in national defense spending is highly correlated with (correlation coefficient = 0.70),
but more volatile than, growth in total spending—it is high during periods of war
(especially the Vietnam War in the late 1960s) and moderately high in the 1980s
(the Carter-Reagan defense buildup); it is often negative in the 1970s and the 1990s,
contributing to a downward trend in the ratio of national defense spending to total
government spending.
We now construct the variable sets for TVARs. In model 1, the vector Ytincludes
three variables to capture real economic activity—the growth rate of real gov-
ernment spending (∆lnGt), the growth rate of real private spending (∆lnZt), and
the growth rate of real GDP (∆lnXt)—and two variables associated with financ-
ing methods and costs—the growth rate of real government debt (∆lnDt) and the
change in the (nominal) interest rate (∆Rt). Real private spending (Zt) is measured
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Real rates (panel A) are measured by rates on three-month treasury bills minus expected infla-
tion from the Livingston Survey (ex ante rate) or minus actual inflation (ex post rate). The debt-output ratio
(panel B) is measured by nominal federal government debt divided by nominal GDP. The growth rates of
total government spending and national defense spending (panel C) are in annualized percentages (see the
appendix).
Figure 1. Real Interest Rates, Debt-to-GDP Ratio, and 
Growth in Government SpendingWoon Gyu Choi and Michael B. Devereux
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by either real private consumption (Ct) or real private investment (It). The interest
rate is measured by the three-month treasury bill rate. Thus, model 1 is given as:11
Model 1: TVAR with the ordering {∆lnGt, ∆lnDt, ∆lnZt, ∆lnXt, ∆Rt}.
To account for money financing of government spending and for inflation,
we also consider a model with monetary growth, inflation, and the interest rate
as follows:
Model 2: TVAR with the ordering {∆lnGt, ∆lnMt, ∆lnZt, ∆lnXt, ∆lnPt, Rt}.
where ∆lnMt and ∆lnPt are, respectively, the growth rate of money and inflation.
The money stock is measured by the monetary base, and the price level by the
GDP deflator. The (annualized) growth rate is measured by multiplying the log
difference of a variable by 400.
The periods of the low- and high-rate regimes may be partly associated with
monetary policy. Tighter monetary policy, which constrains the money financing
of fiscal policy, may lead to increased interest rates although not necessarily to a
high level in the real rate (for example, tight monetary policy in the 1970s; see
Choi, 1999). In particular, tighter monetary policy calls for an increase in the real
rate under the Taylor rule during the Volcker-Greenspan era but not during other
periods (Clarida, Galí, and Gertler, 2000). To control for a channel through which
the effectiveness of fiscal policy could be affected by monetary policy, we include
changes in interest rates (model 1) and interest rates and money growth (model 2).
In model 1, we use all variables in first difference because we find that all level
variables for the whole sample are nonstationary.12 In model 2, to account for the
possibility that the interest rate can be cointegrated with inflation, we include the
interest rate and inflation. We set the lag length at 2 for model 1 with investment
growth and at 3 for other models: this lag length selection is based on the Akaike
information criterion for the whole sample VAR.
The Choleski ordering that places government spending first is based on the
identifying assumption that fiscal shocks have contemporaneous impacts on, but
do not respond contemporaneously to, aggregate spending and other variables
(Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1996).
This assumption is likely to be a reasonable approximation because government
spending must be discussed and approved before it is implemented (Alesina and
11The law of motion of government debt can be written in a simple form as Dt+1 = AGα
t Dβ
t. This can
be rewritten in a log-differenced form, ∆lnDt+1 =α ∆ lnGt +β ∆ lnDt, which can be extended to a more
general form in a VAR.
12For the whole period, all variables in levels in model 1 are stationary, and Johansen’s maximum-
eigenvalue test and trace test reject the null hypothesis of cointegration in model 1 when private spending
is measured by consumption but not when it is measured by investment. For model 2, the growth of mon-
etary base and inflation have a unit root, while the ex post real rate is stationary. We find mild evidence of
cointegration for model 2 when private spending is measured by investment. We also estimate TVARs in
levels to account for possible cointegrations among level variables but the conclusion we obtain is quali-
tatively the same.ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING
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others, 2002) and reacts little to changes in macroeconomic conditions (Fatás
and Mihov, 2003).13
Tests for Threshold Effects
Linearity testing and number of regimes
We perform linearity testing to determine whether a threshold effect exists. If a sin-
gle regime is rejected, we then determine whether there are two or three regimes,
using Hansen’s (1999 and 2000) approach. In each equation, the errors are assumed
to be homoscedastic within a regime but heteroscedastic across regimes.
Table 1 reports the results of linearity testing for the four key variables along
with inflation, assuming a single threshold as the alternative hypothesis. The test
results tend to indicate that the null of linearity is rejected in favor of a single
threshold: the likelihood-ratio test statistic for a threshold effect, F1, is highly sig-
nificant for the interest rate and inflation equations (p < 0.01 for both) and mildly
significant for the investment growth equation (p < 0.10) and the output growth
equation (p < 0.15). The results, however, suggest weak or little evidence of a
threshold effect in the consumption growth equation (especially in model 2, p >
0.40). The least squares estimate of the threshold τ involves some degree of uncer-
tainty, as indicated by a confidence interval (90 percent) that is not very tight and,
in some cases, half-open, possibly owing to small sample size. The number of
observations for the low- and high-rate regimes, for example, in model 1 with con-
sumption growth, is 47 and 120, respectively, classified by a threshold of 0.945.
Although the results are not reported, the same testing procedure yielded no
evidence of nonlinearity for the government spending growth equation (p > 0.30
in most cases). In addition, we find little or weak evidence of nonlinearity for the
government debt growth and money growth equations. The threshold estimate
varies substantially both across models for the investment growth and output
growth equations and across equations (the interest rate equation versus the oth-
ers), suggesting the possibility of a double threshold. Since the F1 statistic tends
to reject the null of no threshold effect for the investment growth, output growth
(model 2), interest rate, and inflation equations, we proceed with a further test to
discriminate between one and two thresholds for these equations.
Table 2 reports the likelihood-ratio test statistic of one versus two thresholds,




U) for the investment growth, output growth, interest rate, and infla-
tion equations in each model. The F2 statistic rejects the null of one threshold in
favor of two thresholds at the 5 percent level for the interest rate and inflation equa-
tions in both models. However, the F2 statistic is insignificant for the investment
13Alesina and others (2002) note that, in the United States, the yearly budget is discussed and approved
during the second half of the preceding year and that additional small fiscal measures are sometimes decided
during the year but most of the time become effective by the end of the year. Fatás and Mihov (2003)
suggest that spending is less prone to simultaneity problems in determining fiscal policy effects than the
budget deficit is because spending is not related to the current state of the economy whereas the budget
deficit is largely affected by the cycle.Woon Gyu Choi and Michael B. Devereux
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equation in both models and largely insignificant for the output equation, except
that it is significant at the 5 percent level for model 2 with ∆lnCt. The 90 percent
confidence intervals for two thresholds are calculated based on the refinement esti-
mator. Again, the confidence intervals of the threshold estimates are not very tight
and, in several cases, half-open, possibly owing to small sample size. Since the F2
statistic indicates strong evidence of a double threshold for the interest rate and
inflation equations, we hereafter consider a three-regime model.
Specification tests for asymmetry across regimes
Table 3 summarizes the specification test results for individual equations in TVARs
with a double threshold. Following Hansen (1996), we compute three test statis-







Equation and Model F1 p-value Estimate interval Low High
Consumption growth equation
Model 1 with ∆ ln Ct 43.4 0.089 0.909 [0.349, 0.963] 45 122
Model 2 with ∆ ln Ct 37.7 0.490 0.584 [   − , 0.999] 40 125
Investment growth equation
Model 1 with ∆ ln It 32.2 0.058 2.715 [2.516, 3.563] 103 65
Model 2 with ∆ ln It 52.5 0.072 0.837 [   −   , 1.144] 43 122
Output growth equation
Model 1 with ∆ ln Ct 39.4 0.142 0.945 [0.566, 1.180] 47 120
with ∆ ln It 28.8 0.116 0.909 [   −   , 1.144] 45 123
Model 2 with ∆ ln Ct 52.7 0.058 1.126 [0.783, 1.180] 52 113
with ∆ ln It 64.6 0.008 0.223 [   −   , 0.891] 34 131
Interest rate equation
Model 1 with ∆ ln Ct 125.1 0.000 3.798 [3.780, −   ] 133 34
with ∆ ln It 87.1 0.000 3.798 [3.780, −   ] 134 34
Model 2 with ∆ ln Ct 91.0 0.000 3.509 [3.166, −   ] 123 42
with ∆ ln It 101.7 0.000 3.509 [3.318, −   ] 123 42
Inflation equation
Model 2 with ∆ ln Ct 147.8 0.000 0.801 [0.783, 0.927] 42 123
with ∆ ln It 165.8 0.000 0.801 [0.783, 0.927] 42 123
Source: Authors’ calculations.
1The likelihood-ratio test statistic, F1, is for the null hypothesis of no threshold against the alter-
native hypothesis of single threshold, following Hansen (1999 and 2000). The number of simulation
replications for each grid was set at J=1,000. The lag length is set at 2 for model 1 with investment
growth and at 3 for other models, based on the Akaike information criterion for the whole sample
vector autoregressions.
2The grid set: Γ={100 grids evenly dividing the range from the 20th to the 80th percentile of
the switching index}. The 90 percent confidence interval for τ is computed using the likelihood-ratio
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tics: SupW, AveW, and ExpW. All three indicate that linearity is rejected against a
double threshold at the 1 percent level in all cases for the interest rate and infla-
tion equations and at the 5 percent level or less for the consumption growth and
investment growth equations. Linearity in the output growth equation is rejected
for model 1 by all the statistics at the 10 percent level and for model 2 at the 1 per-
cent level. We also performed a specification test for parameter constancy across
given subsamples as if the threshold estimate τ (reported in the notes to Figures 3
and 4) were the true value, as in Durlauf and Johnson (1995) and Choi (1999 and
2002). The last three columns of the table provide evidence against parameter con-
stancy across the subsamples in most cases except for the output growth equations
in model 1 with investment growth (p > 0.10). Although the results are not reported,
we found no evidence of asymmetry in government spending growth (test statis-
tics were insignificant at the 10 percent level in all models). Taken together, these
results give credence to threshold effects in interest rates and inflation and (some-
times mild) support for such effects in consumption growth, investment growth,
and output growth.
Overall, the symmetry test results provide evidence on the coefficient shifts in
most of the key regressions, consistent with the proposed switching mechanism.
An increase in government spending not only directly affects aggregate demand
but also affects consumption and investment through, for example, its impact on
interest rates. In addition, it involves the negative impact from the Ricardian effect
through anticipated increases in future tax liabilities. Weak evidence of asymme-
try in consumption (as seen in Table 1) may reflect that shifts in one parameter are
offset by changes in others, leaving the net effect largely intact. However, asym-
metry in other equations in the system can feed into the dynamic properties of con-
sumption through other variables in the system. Thus, and more important, we
need to explore whether the dynamic responses of the economy to a government
spending shock exhibit asymmetry across regimes.
Before examining the different impacts of a spending shock across regimes,
we look at how the regime type and the relation between real rates and output
growth evolve over time. The top panel of Figure 2 displays the regime-type index
based on the estimated thresholds for model 1 with investment growth. The
index indicates the low- and moderate-rate regimes until 1980 (with one exception
in 1967:1) but the high- and moderate-rate regimes after 1980 (with one excep-
tion in 1993:1). The middle panel of Figure 2 depicts output growth (quarter to
quarter, annualized) along with real interest rates—output growth is seen to be
the more volatile series (especially before the mid-1980s). The bottom panel of
Figure 2 shows that the regime mean of real interest rates is negatively related
to that of output growth: the mean of the real rate is −0.97 percent for the low-
rate regime, 1.92 percent for the moderate-rate regime, and 4.94 percent for the
high-rate regime; means for output growth are 3.89, 3.45, and 2.59 percent,
respectively.
Real interest rates are negatively associated with output growth in terms of
the regime mean, and the regime-mean difference of real rates from one regime
to the next is more than 2 percent, much greater than that of output growth. So
abstracting from average output growth in measuring the switching index seemsWoon Gyu Choi and Michael B. Devereux
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a reasonable approximation.14 In addition, business cycle recessions have no sys-
temic relations with the classified regimes (top panel of Figure 2) although they are
clearly negatively associated with output growth (middle panel). Lastly, the rela-
tionship between real rates and output growth accounts for the debt-output ratio tran-
sition in the middle panel of Figure 1: for example, the dominance of the low-rate
regime before 1980—characterized by periods when, on average, real interest rates
were lower than output growth rates—is associated with a downward trend in the
debt-output ratio.
TVAR Models and Impulse Responses to a 
Government Spending Shock
We consider a positive shock of 1 percentage point to the rate of government spend-
ing growth (annualized) and its dynamic effects on the variables in TVARs. Our
14As a result, the use of an alternative switching index—the real interest minus the regime-mean out-
put growth—will not affect the result, while it requires an iterative estimation to obtain the regime-mean
output growth.
Figure 2. Regime-Type Index, Real Interest Rates, and Output Growth
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Regime type in panel A is determined on the basis of the estimated thresholds for model 1 with
investment growth (see notes to Figure 3): low-rate regime, −1; moderate-rate regime, 0; high-rate regime, 1.
The regime mean in panel C is the subsample mean of a variable for the corresponding regime. Vertical lines
indicate National Bureau of Economic Research business cycle peaks and troughs.ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING
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impulse-response analysis focuses on the case in which the real rate is around its
mean under each regime so that small changes in the real rate after the shock do
not entail a shift to another regime.
The response of government spending growth itself to such a shock shows a
similar pattern across regimes (results not shown here): the only difference, if any,
is greater persistence under the low-rate regime than under the others. Therefore,
we focus here on whether the responses of real activity (consumption, investment,
and output) to the shock confirm empirically the anticipated larger impact of gov-
ernment spending when that spending creates less future liabilities than when it
creates more future liabilities. We also examine the associated responses of inter-
est rates, inflation, and financing methods.
Responses of real activity
Figures 3 and 4 depict the responses of consumption or investment growth and
output growth in models 1 and 2. To diagnose the statistical significance of the dif-
ference in the responses between a pair of regimes, we report a t-ratio based on the
estimated responses and the standard errors obtained from bootstrapping—the ratio
of the difference in responses to the square root of the sum of squared simulated
standard errors (regimes are independent of each other). The figures (last column)
also depict the t-ratios (in absolute value) as test statistics for the null hypothesis
of response equality at each horizon between two regimes for three pairs: the low-
versus the moderate-rate regime, the moderate- versus the high-rate regime, and
the high- versus the low-rate regime.
Consumption growth responses (top row of each figure) show initial increases
in the whole sample (far right graph in each row) but differ across regimes. The ini-
tial impacts on consumption growth are stronger under the low-rate regime than
under the moderate-rate regime. This finding may reflect that, under the low-rate
regime, positive impacts from the wealth effect (owing to increased government debt
holdings) for myopic consumers, and the spenders effect for rule-of-thumb con-
sumers, dominate negative impacts from the Ricardian channel and the intertem-
poral substitution effect (with positive responses of real rates; to be shown later).
Under the high-rate regime, however, consumption growth initially increases.
Although in principle the Ricardian effect should be stronger in this case than
under other regimes, it may be offset or dominated by positive impacts from the
wealth and spenders effects (while a possible positive impact from the substitution
effect would be negligible, given insignificant negative responses of real rates).
The asymmetry in initial response of consumption growth is more pronounced in
model 1: t-ratios greater than 2.0 at the first quarter indicate significant differences
in responses between the low- and moderate-rate regimes and between the high-
and low-rate regimes.
The investment growth (third row in each figure) responses of the whole sam-
ple, when significant, are negative for all models—perhaps because of crowding-out
effects. In contrast, the initial impacts are significantly positive under the low-
rate regime but significantly negative under other regimes. This asymmetry may
be explained as follows. The productivity-enhancing effect of higher spendingFigure 3. Impulse Responses of Real Activity in Model 1
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: For model 1 with consumption growth, thresholds τL and τH are 0.358 and 3.643, respectively,
and the number of observations for low, moderate, and high regimes are 37, 93, and 37, respectively. For
model 1 with investment growth, thresholds τL and τH are 0.223 and 3.485, respectively, and the number
of observations for low, moderate, and high regimes are 33, 93, and 42, respectively. Dashed lines are one-
standard-error bands. The last column of each row depicts the absolute values of the t-ratio for asymme-
try in responses between regimes: low versus moderate (solid line), moderate versus high (with square
symbols), and high versus low (with triangle symbols).
A. With Consumption Growth, Response of  t C ln ∆
B. With Consumption Growth, Response of  t Y ln ∆
C. With Investment Growth, Response of  t I ln ∆
D. With Investment Growth, Response of  t Y ln ∆
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Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: For model 2 with consumption growth, thresholds τL and τH are 0.257 and 3.705, respectively,
and the number of observations for low, moderate, and high regimes are 34, 97, and 36, respectively. For
model 2 with investment growth, thresholds τL and τH are 0.257 and 3.395, respectively, and the number
of observations for low, moderate, and high regimes are 34, 88, and 45, respectively. Dashed lines are one-
standard-error bands. The last column of each row depicts the absolute values of the t-ratio for asymme-
try in responses between regimes: low versus moderate (solid line), moderate versus high (with square
symbols), and high versus low (with triangle symbols).
A. With Consumption Growth, Response of  t C ln ∆
B. With Consumption Growth, Response of  t Y ln ∆
C. With Investment Growth, Response of  t I ln ∆
D. With Investment Growth, Response of  t Y ln ∆
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induces higher investment. Under the low-rate regime, investment growth initially
increases (a productivity-enhancing effect) but then declines after a few quarters
as interest rates rise (a crowding-out effect). Conversely, if real rates are suffi-
ciently high, a possible future increase in taxes has two opposing effects on invest-
ment: first, the prospect of higher corporate taxes discourages investment; second,
higher income taxes decrease consumption and increase labor supply (a wealth
effect) and thus investment. The negative responses of investment growth under
the high-rate regime may reflect that the former effect dominates both the latter
and the productivity-enhancing effect. The initial response of investment growth
is significantly different between the low- and moderate-rate regimes and between
the high- and low-rate regimes as shown by high t-ratios at the first quarter.
Output responses (second and fourth rows in each figure) are initially positive
in most cases, but this finding is more pronounced under the low-rate regime than
under other regimes. This finding is consistent with the responses of consumption
and investment growth under each regime. Under the low-rate regime of model 2,
output growth responses show a trough around the fifth quarter, with significantly
negative values, reflecting a V-shape in the investment growth responses. The
moderate-rate regime somewhat mimics the whole sample that entails an initial
positive response. The initial response of output growth is significantly different
between the low- and moderate-rate regimes and between the high- and low-rate
regimes as shown by t-ratios greater than 2.0 at the first quarter except for model 2
with investment growth.
Table 4 reports point estimates and standard errors of averages over time of the
output growth responses. Under the low-rate regime, the first-half-year response is
mostly significant except for model 2 with investment growth: for example, in
model 1 with consumption growth, the response is significantly positive (33.4 basis
points) and about three times as large as that in the whole sample (10.6 basis
points). Under the moderate-rate regime, the first-half-year response is in the
range of 6 to 15 basis points but is significant only in model 1. Under the high-
rate regime, the output growth response is statistically insignificant in all cases:
for example, the first-half-year response is in the range of 1.2 to 8.4 basis points
and insignificant.
The whole-sample analysis in Figures 3 and 4 shows initial positive responses
of consumption growth and output growth and initial negative responses of invest-
ment growth, findings that are consistent with earlier empirical findings that govern-
ment spending shocks have a positive effect on consumption and output (Blanchard
and Perotti, 2002) and a strong negative effect on investment (Blanchard and Perotti,
2002; and Alesina and others, 2002).15 In contrast, the TVAR analysis shows favor-
able initial effects on the growth of investment as well as the growth of consump-
tion and output under the low-rate regime, but less favorable or (significantly or
15Blanchard and Perotti (2002) estimate structural vector autoregression models, which contain tax,
government spending, output, and an individual GDP component (such as consumption or investment) in
a level form controlling for trends, for the post-1960 U.S. data. Alesina and others (2002), using a simple
structural model for a panel of industrial countries, find that government spending shocks lead to a
decrease in the investment-GDP ratio.ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING
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insignificantly) adverse initial effects under other regimes. This asymmetry indi-
cates that expansionary government spending is more conducive to increased real
activity in the short run when real rates are low than when they are high. Although
no direct comparisons with existing studies are possible, this result reconciles
Perotti’s (2004) finding that the effects of fiscal policy on output and its compo-
nents have become substantially weaker over the last 20 years for the United
States (and other industrial countries) because the post-1980 period was largely
one of high- and moderate-rate regimes, whereas the pre-1980 period was largely
one of low- and moderate-rate regimes (bottom panel of Figure 2). Also, consider-
ing that the low-rate regime tends to be associated with the 1970s, a high-inflation
era (top panel of Figure 1), the stronger effect of government spending on aggregate
demand with lower real rates is in accord with Koelln, Rush, and Waldo’s (1996)
finding from cross-country data that the government spending multiplier is higher
if inflation is sufficiently high than it is otherwise.
Responses of interest rates and inflation
The top two rows of Figure 5 show the responses of nominal interest rates to the
government spending shock in model 2. The nominal rate shows greater responses
Table 4. Output Growth Responses
Quarters
Model 1 Model 2
After Shock Low Moderate High Whole Low Moderate High Whole
With ∆ ln Ct With ∆ ln Ct
1–2 33.4 15.2 1.2 10.6 23.9 7.9 2.9 11.3
(9.4) (5.5) (10.5) (3.9) (11.2) (4.6) (11.9) (4.9)
3–4 7.2 7.8 9.1 2.6 −14.2 6.2 −1.1 3.1
(14.5) (5.6) (21.0) (4.9) (22.7) (5.4) (24.7) (4.8)
5–8 −6.2 2.6 8.1 2.2 −12.1 2.3 −39.7 1.1
(10.4) (4.4) (33.6) (3.0) (18.1) (3.1) (79.7) (2.8)
With ∆ ln It With ∆ ln It
1–2 28.8 8.5 8.4 7.7 14.1 6.5 6.0 10.8
(15.5) (3.9) (8.5) (3.5) (12.3) (4.6) (6.6) (4.4)
3–4 −6.2 5.5 4.5 2.4 −14.6 11.8 −8.4 4.8
(16.6) (5.0) (14.6) (4.8) (20.3) (5.8) (15.1) (4.8)
5–8 −0.4 0.5 2.7 −0.1 −15.9 −1.6 −16.6 0.1
(10.8) (2.5) (15.3) (1.9) (17.7) (3.8) (33.0) (2.7)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes:The impulse responses (in basis points) were calculated for the first half-year (1–2 quarters),
the second half (3–4 quarters), and the second year (5–8 quarters) for the low-rate, moderate-rate, and
high-rate regimes as well as for the whole sample. The top (bottom) panel pertains to the responses of
output growth to a government spending shock in models with the consumption (investment) growth
variable. Standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated from the bootstrapping with 1,000 replications.
The estimated grids for TVARs are reported in the corresponding notes to Figures 3 and 4.Figure 5. Impulse Responses of Nominal Interest Rates 
and Inflation in Model 2
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: For model 2 with consumption growth (rows A and C), thresholds τL and τH are 0.257 and 3.705,
respectively, and the number of observations for low, moderate, and high regimes are 34, 97, and 36, respec-
tively. For model 2 with investment growth (rows B and D), thresholds τL and τH are 0.257 and 3.395,
respectively, and the number of observations for low, moderate, and high regimes are 34, 88, and 45, respec-
tively. Dashed lines are one-standard-error bands. The last column of each row depicts the absolute values
of the t-ratio for asymmetry in responses between regimes: low versus moderate (solid line), moderate ver-
sus high (with square symbols), and high versus low (with triangle symbols).
A. With Consumption Growth, Response of Nominal Interest Rates 
B. With Investment Growth, Response of Nominal Interest Rates
C. With Consumption Growth, Response of Inflation 
D. With Investment Growth, Response of Inflation 
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under the low-rate regime than under the other regimes. Nominal rate responses are
significantly positive for about three quarters from the second quarter under the
low-rate regime. However, smaller positive or little responses under the moderate-
rate regime and (significantly or insignificantly) negative responses under the high-
rate regime and for the whole sample are shown. High t-ratios at the third and
fourth quarters, especially between the high- and low-rate regimes, indicate signif-
icant differences in the nominal rate responses at the corresponding quarters.
Conventional macroeconomic theory suggests that expansionary govern-
ment spending raises interest rates, a consequence that one would expect if aggre-
gate demand rises (an income effect). But why does the shock have a positive
impact on the nominal interest rate only under the low-rate regime? The initial
positive responses of output growth under the low-rate regime, which exert
upward pressures on interest rates, partly answer this question. Nonetheless, a
thorough answer requires a further look at the responses of inflation and real
interest rates.
The bottom two rows of Figure 5 depict inflation responses to the shock under
different regimes. Significant positive inflation responses are seen under the low-
rate regime with a lag, which is largely attributable to upward pressures from aggre-
gate demand, occurring with a lag. In contrast, under the high-rate regime and for
the whole sample, negative or little responses of inflation are seen.16 They are also
consistent with positive (nonpositive) responses of nominal interest rates under
the low-rate (high-rate) regime as implied by a Fisher effect. The asymmetry in infla-
tion responses is significant between the high- and low-rate regimes (and between
the low- and moderate-rate regimes for model 2 with consumption growth), as indi-
cated by high t-ratios at the fourth and fifth quarters.
Nonpositive responses of nominal rates under the high- and moderate-rate
regimes may suggest that the Mankiw (1987) effect of government spending on real
rates is regime-dependent. The Mankiw effect will be stronger under the high-rate
regime because government spending is more costly to finance and thus induces
stronger negative impacts on consumption (through the Ricardian effect) and real
rates when real rates are high than when they are low.
To test our conjecture that the Mankiw effect is partly responsible for the neg-
ative response of nominal rates to an increase in government spending, we look at
real rate responses. We put the ex post real rate, rrt, measured by the period-t nom-
inal rate minus the period-t + 1 inflation rate in place of Rt in model 2, to account
for the effect of government spending on interest rates through money growth and
inflation responses. We refer to this modified version as model 2′. Figure 6 shows
real rate responses in this model. Under the low-rate regime, the real rate responses
tend to be significantly positive, perhaps because the effect on real rates of the
associated increase in aggregate demand dominates the Mankiw effect. Conversely,
under the moderate- and high-rate regimes, insignificant or negative responses
are shown. The whole sample shows largely insignificant effects of government
16Commodity price inflation can be included in model 2 to cope with the “price puzzle”—the finding
that a monetary tightening leads to a rising rather than falling price level (Leeper, Sims, and Zha, 1996;
and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 1996). We find that the inclusion of commodity price inflation
does not alter our main results.Figure 6. Impulse Responses of Real Interest Rates in Model 2′
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: For model 2′ with consumption growth, thresholds τL and τH are 1.398 and 3.812, respectively,
and the number of observations for low, moderate, and high regimes are 60, 72, and 34, respectively. For
model 2′ with investment growth, thresholds τL and τH are 1.363 and 2.641, and the number of observations
for low, moderate, and high regimes are 59, 42, and 65, respectively. Dashed lines are one-standard-error
bands. The last column of each row depicts the absolute values of the t-ratio for asymmetry in responses
between pairs of regimes: low versus moderate (solid line), moderate versus high (with square symbols),
and high versus low (with triangle symbols).
A. With Consumption Growth 
B. With Investment Growth 
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spending on real rates. The real rate responses tend to be greater under the low-rate
regime compared with other regimes. In particular, the initial response in the model
with investment growth is significantly different between the low- and high-rate
regimes, as shown by the t-ratio at the first quarter.
To the extent that a positive shock to government spending leads to budget
deficits given existing tax rates, the nonpositive responses of inflation and interest
rates in the whole sample and the high-rate regime are consistent with earlier find-
ings that budget deficits have little effect on prices (Dwyer, 1982) and on real and
nominal rates of interest (Evans, 1987), supported by the Ricardian effect. In con-
trast, the positive responses of interest rates under the low-rate regime reconcile
the Keynesian prediction.
The low-rate regime tends to be associated with periods of high inflation, and
the high-rate regime with periods of low inflation. Given this, our finding of positive
responses of inflation only under the low-rate regime reconciles Fischer, Sahay, and
Végh’s (2002) finding of a significant positive association between inflation and the
fiscal deficit for countries and periods with high inflation but not for low-inflation
countries and for low-inflation periods in usually high-inflation countries. Also, the
stronger effect of government spending on inflation with lower real rates and thus
higher inflation is consistent with Ball, Mankiw, and Romer’s (1988) contention
that the sensitivity of inflation to aggregate demand shocks increases with inflation
because economic agents adjust more frequently to keep up with inflation.ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING
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Responses of financing methods
Figure 7 depicts the responses of government debt growth (in model 1) and money
growth (in model 2) to the government spending shock. In all regimes and the
whole sample, additional government spending initially increases debt issuance
(first and second rows of the figure). Under the low-rate regime, debt finance is
significantly positive initially but becomes small or insignificant as real returns on
bonds, whose level was initially low, rise (see Figure 6). The responses of debt
growth under the low-rate regime is different from those under other regimes—
significantly in model 1 but insignificantly in model 2 (owing to large standard
errors), as implied by the t-ratio at the first quarter.
Substitution between government debt issuance and money creation in the face
of different levels of real rates reflects attempts to reduce the cost of government
spending. Notably, money growth (third and fourth rows) rises significantly after a
short lag, showing a hump shape, under the high-rate regime but not under the low-
rate regime, whereas it shows only a brief initial increase under the moderate-rate
regime. This finding suggests that the financing of government spending relies on
money creation only when the cost of debt financing is relatively high. Under the
high-rate regime, the positive response of money growth dampens as the real rate,
whose level was initially high, declines. Under the low-rate regime, the V-shaped
responses of money growth seem to mirror the V-shaped responses in investment and
consumption growth. The significance of asymmetry in responses is indicated by
high t-ratios: for example, the t-ratios are greater than 2 between the high- and low-
rate regimes at the fourth and fifth quarters in model 2 with consumption growth.
Robustness Checks and Discussion
We find that the use of alternative variable sets (the real money stock M1 in place of
the monetary base, and real interest rates in place of nominal interest rates) and dif-
ferent ordering in TVARs (for example, placing money growth after output growth)
do not affect the main results qualitatively. Also, alternative lag lengths yield qual-
itatively similar results.
As an alterative switching index, we used the ex ante real interest rate. The
results are similar with respect to the existence of a double threshold, but overall
we find less pronounced asymmetries in the dynamic responses to a government
spending shock—perhaps because the overshooting in the ex ante real rate before
1980 results in an obtuse discrimination of observations between the low- and
moderate-rate regimes (top panel of Figure 1). Table 5 reports the point estimates
and standard errors of the average output growth response over time with this
switching index. A pattern similar to that in Table 4 is observed although asym-
metric effects are often less pronounced. Using another alternative switching index
measured by the government debt-to-output ratio, we found no evidence on asym-
metry in consumption (or investment) and output growth equations and no evi-
dence on asymmetric effects of government spending, although linearity testing
suggests a single threshold for the interest rate and inflation equations. As noted
earlier, the gradient, rather than the level, of the debt-output ratio is associated
with the real interest rate. Hence, no evidence of asymmetric fiscal policy effectsWoon Gyu Choi and Michael B. Devereux
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Figure 7. Impulse Responses of Financing Methods in Models 1 and 2
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: For model 1 with consumption growth (row A) and investment growth (row B), respectively,
thresholds τL and τH are 0.358 and 3.643, and 0.223 and 3.485, and the number of observations for low,
moderate, and high regimes are 37, 93, and 37, and 33, 93, and 42. For model 2 with consumption growth
(row C) and investment growth (row D), respectively, thresholds τL and τH are 0.257 and 3.705, and 0.257
and 3.395, and the number of observations for low, moderate, and high regimes are 34, 97, and 36, and
34, 88, and 45. Dashed lines are one-standard-error bands. The last column of each row depicts the abso-
lute values of the t-ratio for asymmetry in responses between regimes: low versus moderate (solid line),
moderate versus high (with square symbols), and high versus low (with triangle symbols).
A. With Consumption Growth, Responses of  t D ln ∆ , Model 1 
B. With Investment Growth, Responses of  t D ln ∆ , Model 1 
C. With Consumption Growth, Responses of  t M ln ∆ ,  Model 2 
D. With Investment Growth, Responses of  t M ln ∆ , Model 2 ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING
175
in terms of the debt-output ratio suggests that the dynamics of debt—an integral
part of forming agents’expectations for future fiscal consolidation—is more impor-
tant for assessing debt sustainability than the current status of debt.
The composition of expenditure may matter (Kormendi, 1983; Aschauer,
1989; Barro and Sala-ì-Martin, 1992; and Tanzi and Zee, 1997). For example, an
increase in spending on government wages and salaries will have a less favorable
impact on output than equivalent expenditure on goods and services and capital
projects. Also, a shock to defense spending may have a different impact on the
economy than a shock to spending elsewhere in the budget.17 However, we consider
total government spending rather than expenditure composition, emphasizing the
implication of the financing cost of government spending for future tax liabilities
17Kormendi (1983) finds from U.S. data that defense spending is between government investment and
government consumption in terms of the size of the crowding-out effect on private consumption. Evans and
Karras (1998), using cross-country data analysis, suggest that private consumption and nonmilitary gov-
ernment spending are substitutes, whereas private consumption and military spending are complements.
Table 5. Output Growth Responses with Ex Ante Real Rates 
as Switching Index
Quarters
Model 1 Model 2
After Shock Low Moderate High Whole Low Moderate High Whole
With ∆ ln Ct With ∆ ln Ct
1–2 23.2 −5.4 8.4 10.6 31.7 5.3 8.2 11.3
(7.8) (10.4) (13.7) (3.9) (12.9) (6.3) (6.1) (4.9)
3–4 2.6 −3.3 14.9 2.6 −12.8 0.3 6.0 3.1
(11.3) (9.8) (14.6) (4.9) (20.2) (6.0) (13.1) (4.8)
5–8 9.7 2.7 7.3 2.2 1.2 −1.5 −10.2 1.1
(9.0) (5.7) (15.9) (3.0) (13.5) (4.5) (32.8) (2.8)
With ∆ ln It With ∆ ln It
1–2 26.2 −1.1 1.2 7.7 31.8 −7.0 7.8 10.8
(9.4) (6.8) (6.3) (3.5) (15.6) (5.5) (7.2) (4.4)
3–4 −1.1 −3.3 12.6 2.4 −14.3 −1.3 12.4 4.8
(10.0) (7.2) (11.4) (4.8) (21.2) (7.2) (10.0) (4.8)
5–8 1.3 −1.0 5.6 −0.1 2.5 −2.7 4.3 0.1
(4.3) (3.5) (11.5) (1.9) (17.3) (6.5) (10.8) (2.7)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: The ex ante real rate is measured as the three-month treasury bill rate minus expected infla-
tion. As a proxy for expected inflation, the six-months-ahead forecast of inflation is taken from the
Livingston Survey and interpolated at quarterly frequency. See notes for Table 4. The lag lengths chosen
are the same as those for models with the ex post real rate as switching index (Table 4). For model 1 with
consumption growth and model 1 with investment growth, thresholds τL and τH are commonly 1.713 and
2.592, respectively, and the number of observations for low, moderate, and high regimes are 54, 53, and
61; and 54, 53, and 60, respectively. For model 2 with consumption growth and model 2 with investment
growth, thresholds τL and τH are 1.157 and 2.943 and 1.157 and 2.592, respectively, and the number of
observations for low, moderate, and high regimes are 37, 83, and 47; and 37, 70, and 60, respectively.Woon Gyu Choi and Michael B. Devereux
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as a whole: it is difficult to take into account the implications of any individual
expenditure component for the economy’s tax liabilities because higher spending
on any individual component could be offset by lower spending on others. Thus,
using national defense spending as a measure of fiscal policy has limitations for
our purpose. Nonetheless, we use this measure of fiscal policy for comparison and
find that linearity testing supports threshold effects in TVARs. Compared with a
shock to total government spending, a shock to national defense spending shows
similar but less marked asymmetric effects across regimes and tends to have a
greater crowding-out effect on consumption and investment irrespective of the
regime (results not shown).
Our impulse-response analysis assumes no communication across regimes—
that is, the economy stays within its initial regime—as we consider the case when
the real rate is around its mean under each regime so that changes in the real rate
after the shock do not entail a shift to another regime. This assumption remains
robust as a good approximation because a 1 percentage point shock does not have
much of an effect on the real rate: the effect is only about 10 basis points at its peak
or trough, as Figure 6 shows. Thus, the current regime at the mean value of real
rates is expected to prevail after the shock—the cumulative response of the real
rate after eight quarters is less than 80 basis points, so the switching index does
not hit threshold values. Nonetheless, one may consider a more general case in
which a government spending shock affects the real rate enough to cause switch-
ing back and forth across regimes. For example, suppose government spending
rises in the low-rate regime. Economic agents would anticipate a small rise in
financing costs, and thus the crowding-out effects would be small, but in fact there
is some probability of switching to a higher-rate regime.18 In general, however,
the (conditional and nonlinear) responses depend not only on the level of real rates
(initial conditions) but also on the size of the shock, rendering any summary of
expected responses intractable.
Since the low-rate regime is largely concentrated in the 1970s, one may wonder
if a subsample period analysis may give similar implications. In general, however,
time series sufficiently long for regression analysis will involve a mix of different
regimes. In particular, since observations during the 1990s are rather an even mix of
the high- and moderate-rate regimes (see Figure 2), threshold models can better
explain the data than can the subsample analysis. Moreover, the low-rate regime,
largely coinciding with a high-inflation era in the United States, corresponds to
observations for countries and periods with high inflation in the cross-country
dimension. As noted earlier, our finding on the positive response of inflation only
under the low-rate regime reconciles Fischer, Sahay, and Végh’s (2002) finding
from cross-country data. Therefore, rather than restricting differential impacts of
fiscal policy by using a chronological time scale, our threshold model analysis—
18To allow for shifts to other regimes at the margin, one may consider the estimation averages over the
actual histories of real rates conditional on each regime, given a fixed size of shocks. This approach will
somewhat smooth out differences across regimes but will not affect our results qualitatively, given that the
moderate-rate regime, as a middle ground in the characteristics of responses, buffers a transition from one
extreme regime to the other extreme unless the shock is extremely large.ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENT SPENDING
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which assigns an observation to one of the regimes classified by a switching index
and threshold estimates—provides implications for state- or regime-dependent
effects of fiscal policy, encompassing those that otherwise might have been
obtained from subsample time series or cross-section analyses.
We find evidence that, in times of low real interest rates, a fiscal expansion is
conducive to boosting economic activity in the short run. However, such a stimu-
lating effect dies out fast if fiscal policy continues to be expansionary enough to
deteriorate the economic environment by raising real rates and accelerating debt
accumulation, thus switching to a high-rate regime. In particular, an expansionary
fiscal policy could be less than effective for an economy with persistent govern-
ment deficits and pervasively high real rates. Since perfect foresight during the
entire time horizon of interest is often far from reality, agents can update their
assessment of debt sustainability based on the evolving status determined by the
financial cost of fiscal policy. Thus, no perpetual benign effect of fiscal policy is
warranted for an economy, even if it starts with the low-rate regime. Furthermore, fis-
cal policy entails a trade-off between volatility and efficacy because an aggressive
fiscal policy induces macroeconomic volatility, which in turn lowers economic
growth, as shown in Fatás and Mihov (2003).
IV. Conclusions
Earlier studies have looked for nonlinear effects of fiscal policy based on different
characteristics of the fiscal impetus or of consumers’expectations about future fis-
cal adjustment to achieve government debt sustainability. Little evidence, how-
ever, has been provided on the link between the efficacy of fiscal policy and the
financing cost of government spending. This paper provides new evidence on the
relative effectiveness of fiscal policy at different levels of real interest rates. It shows
that government spending has a significant, positive short-run impact on aggregate
spending at low real rates but not much of an impact at relatively high real rates.
Additional findings on asymmetric effects of fiscal policy are noteworthy. First,
government spending raises inflation and nominal interest rates, owing to higher
aggregate demand, only when real interest rates are relatively low. Second, at low
real rates, the effect of increased government spending on real rates is positive; and,
at high real rates, it can be negative. Third, government spending induces initial debt
issuances, especially at low real rates, and money creation at relatively high real
rates. This indicates that substitution between debt issuance and money creation
depends on the financing cost of government spending.
We interpret the new evidence on the asymmetric effects of fiscal policy on
economic activity as suggesting that fiscal policy is likely to be more conducive to
short-run growth when real interest rates are low. However, a ballooning govern-
ment debt with persistent, expansionary government spending can be perceived as
constraining fiscal policy—fiscal austerity thus may form a stronger foundation
for the efficacy of fiscal policy in times of need.
Lastly, our findings suggest that the nonlinearity in the effects of fiscal policy
is associated with the link between the time-varying cost of financing government
spending and the fiscal multiplier. It will be interesting in future research toWoon Gyu Choi and Michael B. Devereux
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examine how the real interest rate, which is the financing cost of government
spending, is determined by, for example, the underlying monetary regime and how
it therefore affects the responses of economic activity to fiscal policy in a general
equilibrium framework. In doing this, as emphasized by Mankiw (2000) and Galí,
López-Salido, and Vallés (2005), the substantial heterogeneity in consumer be-
havior, consistent with findings from micro data, may play an important role in
explaining the data.
Appendix
Data Sources and Description of the Variables
We use the U.S. quarterly series, obtained from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) at the
website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, in our analysis. Variable definitions and FRED
code names are as follows: X = real GDP, chained 1996 dollars (GDPC1); nominal GDP (GDP);
P = GDP deflator (= GDP/GDPC1); G = real government consumption expenditures and gross
investment, chained 1996 dollars (GCEC1); real national defense spending = nominal national
defense consumption expenditures and gross investment (FDEFX) divided by the GDP deflator;
C = real personal consumption expenditure, chained 1996 dollars (PCECC96); I = real fixed pri-
vate domestic investment, chained 1996 dollars (FPIC1); D = nominal federal government debt
(defined below) divided by GDP deflator; M = the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’adjusted
monetary base (BOGAMBSL); money stock M1 (M1SL); and R = the three-month treasury bill
rate, percent per annum (TB3MS). The data available at monthly frequency from the source are
averaged to obtain quarterly observations. The nominal federal government debt is taken from the
IMF’s International Financial Statistics and seasonally adjusted (by X12).
The growth rate of a variable x in annual percentage is defined as ∆ ln xt = 400   ln(xt / xt−1).
The lagged ex post real interest rate is defined as rrt−1 = Rt−1 − 400   (Pt / Pt−1 − 1). The lagged
ex ante real interest rate is measured by Rt−1 minus the expected inflation rate for period t, for
which the six-months-ahead forecast of the monthly base value of CPI taken from the Livingston
Survey is interpolated at quarterly frequency.
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